University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2015

Can We Learn Anything About Pleading Changes from Existing
Data?
Jonah B. Gelbach
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Litigation Commons, Multivariate Analysis Commons, Other Legal Studies Commons, Policy
Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Statistical Methodology Commons

Repository Citation
Gelbach, Jonah B., "Can We Learn Anything About Pleading Changes from Existing Data?" (2015). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1652.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1652

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

30-Jul-15] Can We Learn Anything About Pleading Changes?

1

CAN WE LEARN ANYTHING ABOUT PLEADING CHANGES FROM EXISTING
DATA?

Jonah B. Gelbach*
(202) 427-6093
jgelbach@law.upenn.edu

This version: July 30, 2015
Abstract
In light of the gateway role that the pleading standard can play in
our civil litigation system, measuring the empirical effects of pleading
policy changes embodied in the Supreme Court’s controversial Twombly
and Iqbal cases is important. In my earlier paper, Locking the Doors to
Discovery, I argued that in doing so, special care is required in formulating
the object of empirical study. Taking party behavior seriously, as Locking
the Doors does, leads to empirical results suggesting that Twombly and
Iqbal have had substantial effects among cases that face Rule 12(b)(6)
motions post-Iqbal. This paper responds to potentially important critiques
of my empirical implementation made by the FJC’s Joe Cecil and Professor
David Engstrom. An additional contribution of the present paper is to
elucidate some important challenges for empirical work in civil procedure.
First, researchers should carefully consider which covariates belong in
statistical models, while also taking care in assessing the empirical
importance of controlling for covariates. Second, data collection protocols
should be designed with behavioral assumptions in mind. But third,
researchers should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good: even data
protocols that are less than perfectly designed may be broadly useful.
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Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank Steve Burbank,
Joe Cecil, David Engstrom, Jacob Goldin, William Hubbard, Jon Klick, Bruce Kobayashi,
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There has been much disagreement concerning the effects of the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.2 In Twombly, the Court retired Conley v. Gibson’s “no set of facts”
standard for adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, at least as to parallel conduct antitrust actions.3 Iqbal then
extended Twombly’s plausibility pleading standard trans-substantively, to
“all civil actions.” Many observers—academics, other professional
researchers, and practitioners—have debated the empirical effects of
Twombly and Iqbal. Most of the studies involved in this debate are based on
assessment of how (some measure of the) Rule 12(b)(6) grant rate changed
between the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal time periods. Debates over these
studies have been nearly as controverted as the Twombly and Iqbal cases
themselves, with some arguing that the evidence shows Twombly and Iqbal
have substantially changed Rule 12(b)(6) adjudication practice and others
arguing the opposite.4
In my own paper on the topic, Locking the Doors to Discovery
(hereinafter “Locking the Doors”),5 I argued that perceived changes in the
pleading standard can be expected to cause parties to change their
behavior—whether plaintiffs file suit, and whether defendants challenge
filed actions with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, and whether parties to a dispute
are able to settle. If party behavior is endogenous, then pre/post
comparisons in grant rates might involve an apples-to-oranges problem
when these comparisons are used as a way to measure the ceteris paribus
changes in the probability that a judge would grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
in a given set of cases—which I term “judicial behavior effects”.
Indeed, evidence in a study released by the Federal Judicial Center
(“FJC”) indicates that while Rule 12(b)(6) motions aren’t filed all that
often, in those district courts the FJC studied, the share of filed actions in
which Rule 12(b)(6) motions were filed rose by more than 50%.6 Such a
change is consistent with what I referred to as defendant selection effects:
other things equal, rational defendants should be more willing to bear the
costs of litigating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if they expect to be more likely to
win on that motion. I considered two other types of selection, as well.
Plaintiff selection effects occur in those disputes such that plaintiffs would
1

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (“In appraising the sufficiency of the
complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”).
4
Citations for these propositions may be found in (Gelbach, 2012).
5
(Gelbach, 2012).
6
(Cecil, et al., March 2011) (hereinafter, “FJC initial report”).
2
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file suit under the Conley pleading standard, but not under the plausibility
pleading standard. And settlement selection effects occur in those disputes
that would be settled before the answer/Rule 12(b)(6) stage under one
pleading standard but that would be litigated through that stage under the
other pleading standard.
In Locking the Doors, I showed that party selection effects
“unidentify” Rule 12(b)(6) motion grant rate comparisons when these are
used. That is, I show that even the possibility that parties might change their
behavior in response to changes in the pleading standard implies that grant
rate comparisons do not tell us anything discernible about how Twombly
and Iqbal have changed judicial behavior in any fixed set of cases.
Moreover, I showed in Locking the Doors that judicial behavior
effects are too limited a measure of Twombly and Iqbal’s effects in any
event. This is true because changes in party behavior that arise from
perceived changes in the pleading standard can affect parties’ welfare
directly, even holding constant judicial behavior. To account for such
effects, I constructed the category of “negatively affected” cases among
those in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would be filed under the plausibility
pleading standard. This category comprises the set of disputes in which, as a
but-for result of Twombly and Iqbal, either (i) the plaintiff fails to get to
discovery, or (ii) a dispute that would be settled before the Rule 12(b)(6)
stage instead winds up with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion being both litigated and
granted.
As I discussed in Locking the Doors, it is not possible to estimate
this negatively affected share of cases without very strong assumptions—
assumptions strong enough to pin down the frequency of various types of
selection.7 However, I also showed how one can use observable data to
calculate a lower bound on this negatively affected share. As I shall discuss
in Part I, doing so requires only data on the numbers (or frequency) of Rule
12(b)(6) motions filed and granted in the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal
periods—data that are available from the two FJC reports. The formula for
my negatively affected share can be conveniently decomposed into the sum
of two components. The first component is the change in the Rule 12(b)(6)
7

The underlying problem is that observing the numbers of disputes exhibiting
selection of various types—defendant selection, plaintiff selection, or settlement
selection—would require observing how a dispute would be resolved under each of two
mutually exclusive pleading standards. This impossibility is sometimes known as the
fundamental problem of evaluation. This problem can be solved only via sufficiently
powerful assumptions; for a discussion of the role of behavioral assumptions in empirical
work in civil procedure, see (Gelbach, 2014) (hereinafter “Dark Arts”). While assumptions
should be as weak as possible, in order to minimize the extent to which the assumptions
lead one to incorrect results, still there may be no way to both (i) avoid making
substantively restrictive assumptions and (ii) learn anything of policy relevance.
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grant rate—i.e., the same measure that most other studies have used to
measure the effects of Twombly and Iqbal. The second component measures
how substantial the change in the number of filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions has
been; the greater the relative post-Iqbal increase in the number of such
motions filed, the greater will be this component.
The resulting lower bounds indicate that Twombly and Iqbal
negatively affected a substantial share of cases in which Rule 12(b)(6)
motions were filed post-Iqbal: plaintiffs were negatively affected in at least
18.1% of civil rights cases, 15.4% of employment discrimination cases, and
21.5% of contract, tort, and various other cases. Further, all three of these
estimates are statistically significantly different from zero. These findings
occur even though the grant rate itself does not change discernibly for either
the employment discrimination or contract, tort, and “other” case categories.
Importantly, for all three categories I studied, a substantial part of the
estimated negatively affected share would be missed if one did not account
for selection effects via the second component of my lower bound formula.
The approach I took in Locking the Doors, and by extension the
results just discussed, have been criticized in two thoughtful articles. The
first article, to which I shall refer as “Twiqbal Puzzle,” was written by
Professor David Engstrom;8 the other, to which I shall refer as “Waves,”
was written by Joe Cecil of the FJC,9 who was the lead author on both FJC
reports. Between them, Cecil and Engstrom lodge three types of criticisms.
Because I have elsewhere addressed the first critique, which concerns the
appropriateness of the substantive behavioral framework (including my
choice of unit of analysis), I shall not do so here.10
The purpose of the present paper is to respond in detail to the other
two critiques. Filing this response is worthwhile partly because the question
of whether Twombly and Iqbal had substantial effects is itself important.
But it is also worthwhile for the broader reason that Cecil’s and Engstrom’s
critiques raise issues with relevance to the design and implementation of
future empirical work concerning civil litigation. The second critique
concerns whether and how one should use multivariate models in an effort
to control for non-Twombly/Iqbal changes that might have contributed to
measured changes in Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice and adjudication. I
respond to this critique in detail in Part III, infra. The third critique concerns
whether it is appropriate to use the FJC data as I do—combining
information from separate studies of the frequency with which Rule
12(b)(6) motions are filed, and of the frequency with which such motions
are granted among cases in which they are filed. I respond to this critique in
8

(Cecil, 2012) [hereinafter “Waves”].
(Engstrom, 2013).
10
Interested readers should see Dark Arts.
9
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detail in Part IV, infra.
The overall takeaway point from my response to these critiques is
straightforward. I do not believe that either critique detracts from the
empirical validity or relevance of the estimates I reported in Locking the
Doors. That is not to say that the issues Cecil and Engstrom raise couldn’t
be important in principle. But the arguments they make are less problematic
for my approach than is at first apparent, and the relevant empirical
evidence strongly suggests that the qualitative conclusions in Locking the
Doors are appropriate and robust to Cecil and Engstrom’s critiques.
I. A QUICK SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH IN LOCKING THE DOORS
Here I briefly summarize the empirical approach and results in Locking
the Doors.11
I define a dispute as involving a negatively affected plaintiff if (i) preTwombly, the plaintiff would either reach discovery as to all claims or
achieve some sort of settlement as to all claims, while (ii) post-Iqbal, under
the plausibility pleading standard, the plaintiff would lose on at least one
claim as a result of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In Locking the Doors, I focused
on saying something about the share of cases that are negatively affected in
this sense, among those cases that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed in the
post-Iqbal period studies.
Define the number of cases in which Rule 12(b)(6) motions are filed
pre-Twombly as Mpre and the number of such motions granted post-Iqbal as
Mpost. Define the number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted pre-Twombly as
Gpre and the number of such motions granted post-Iqbal as Gpost. In Locking
the Doors, I demonstrate that the negatively affected share in question is
never less than the following simple ratio:
(1)

LB

≡

,

so that LB
is a lower bound on the negatively affected share.
Here is an intuitive explanation for this claim. By definition of but-for
causation, if a real or perceived change in the pleading standard but-for
causes a dispute to have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted post-Iqbal, then
that dispute (i) must have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted post-Iqbal and (ii)
must not have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted pre-Twombly. Thus, the
numerator of equation (1), which is the change in the number of cases with
Rule 12(b)(6) grants, must include all such but-for caused cases. Note that
11

Readers interested in more detail should see my 2012 paper Locking the Doors or
my 2014 paper Dark Arts.
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the numerator does not include any cases that would have Rule 12(b)(6)
motions granted under both pleading standards, since those cases are by
definition present in equal numbers in Gpre and Gpost. Thus, if the only types
of cases were those but-for caused by the plausibility pleading standard to
have Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted under Twombly/Iqbal, and those
entirely unaffected, then the numerator of equation (1) would identify the
number of cases with plaintiffs negatively affected in the way I defined
above.
However, there is one other set of negatively affected cases to consider.
This third set consists of those cases that would have Rule 12(b)(6) motions
granted under the plausibility pleading standard but not under the Conley
standard; such cases could occur due to defendant selection or settlement
selection.12 The possible presence of such cases means that the numerator of
(1) does not equal the number of negatively affected cases among those
facing Rule 12(b)(6) motions post-Iqbal. Note, though, that there must be at
least zero cases in our third category, i.e., there cannot be a negative
number. Consequently, the number of negatively affected cases can never
be less than the numerator of (1), which means this numerator is a lower
bound on my number of negatively affected cases.13
As noted above, the data I used in Locking the Doors come from the two
FJC reports. As I shall discuss in detail in Part IV, infra, the FJC data on
motion adjudication and motion filing come from different data-collection
exercises, which somewhat complicates the use of formula (1). For this
reason, it is useful to observe that this formula can be rewritten as follows:
LB

(2)

≡ g

g

g
where

,
≡

.

Here, gpost is the share of post-Iqbal cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6)
12

To illustrate how such cases could arise due to defendant selection, consider a
dispute in which, under Conley, a plaintiff would file suit, and the defendant would answer;
this suit would not be represented in Gpre. If the defendant would file a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion under Twombly/Iqbal, then the case would be represented in Gpost. In the settlement
selection version of this story, the same events occur under Twombly/Iqbal as in our
plaintiff selection story, but the case settles pre-Rule 12(b)(6) adjudication under Conley.
13
Locking the Doors provided a considerably more detailed exposition of this
argument, because doing so has certain other methodological advantages. Given the
simplicity of the argument as I have provided it here, it does not require technical
elaboration via probability theory. However, it is worth noting that there is an extensive
econometric literature on the identification of treatment-effect bounds; for early salvos, see
(Manski, 1989) and (Manski, 1990).
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motion is granted, among those in which such a motion is filed; gpre is the
corresponding share of pre-Twombly cases.14 Formula (2) shows that the
lower bound can be expressed as the sum of two components. The first
component is the change in the Rule 12(b)(6) grant rate, which is the
measure on which other studies have primarily focused. The second
component, which helps account for selection-related effects, is the product
of the pre-Twombly Rule 12(b)(6) grant rate and m, which is a measure of
the increase in Rule 12(b)(6) motion filings: m equals the share of postIqbal cases facing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that is accounted for by increases
in the number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed.
Table 1: The Change in the Percentage of Movants Prevailing and
the Lower bound on the Negatively Affected Share
Second
Percentage of Movants
Prevailing
component
in formula
Lower
(2)
bound
(product
(sum of
of first and third and
fourth
fifth
a
a
b
2006 2010 Change
m
columns) columns)
Civil rights

60.3

68.1

7.8

0.17

10.3

18.1

Employment
discrimination

60.9

61.1

0.2

0.25

15.2

15.4

Contract, tort
and other

55.2

56.3

1.1

0.37

20.4

21.5

a
b

Source: Table 4 of Locking the Doors, at 2331.
Source: Table 5 of Locking the Doors, at 2333.

Table 1 reports data sufficient to calculate my lower bound for three
case categories using the FJC reports’ data for 2006 (the pre-Twombly
period) and 2010 (the post-Iqbal period).15 The table’s first column shows
that, across all categories, the percentage of movants prevailing in the preTwombly period varies between roughly 55% and roughly 61%. The other
factor here is the ratio m, which measures the relative importance of
increased Rule 12(b)(6) motion filing; as the figures reported in the fourth
14

Thus, gpost=Gpost/Mpost, and gpre=Gpre/Mpre.
Note that I here exclude cases involving financial instruments or ADA
discrimination claims; see discussion in (Gelbach, 2012).
15
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column of the table show, this increase was substantial, especially for
employment discrimination and contract, tort, and other cases.
The results in the final column of Table 1 indicate that plaintiffs must
have been negatively affected in a substantial share of cases that faced Rule
12(b)(6) motions post-Iqbal: the lower bounds are 18.1% for civil rights
cases, 15.4% for employment discrimination cases, and 21.5% for contract,
tort and other cases. These estimates are statistically significantly different
from zero.16 In light of the sizable second-component estimates reported in
the table’s fifth column, the results also indicate that party selection effects
played a substantial role in this negative-effects story.
Before I turn to the methodological issues that are at the heart of this
paper, I briefly address a number of erroneous characterizations Cecil has
lodged concerning my treatment of party selection effects in Locking the
Doors. First, Cecil points out that between the filing study’s pre-Twombly
and post-Iqbal observation periods, there was only a small drop in the
number of “total other” cases filed, alongside an increase in the number of
filings of civil rights and employment discrimination cases. From this he
concludes that in Locking the Doors I
“find[] little or no plaintiff selection effect, which is quite a surprise
since such a plaintiff selection effect is a fundamental component of
[Locking the Doors’] model of pretrial litigation and the foundation
of Priest/Klein model of litigation from which [the] model is
derived.”17
But my model is not derived from the Priest/Klein model.18 And I do
not actually “find,” or even claim to find, anything as to the presence of the
plaintiff selection effect. The interplay of all three types of party selection
effects is such that, without making substantive assumptions about the
distribution of various types of party beliefs, it is impossible to say whether
the number of cases filed will go up, go down, or stay the same following a
perceived change in the pleading standard.19
Elsewhere in this part of his critique, Cecil explains that the “evidence
for [a small plaintiff selection] effect seems very tenuous,” citing specific
observed numbers of filings.20 But among the central methodological
problems raised in Locking the Doors is precisely the fact that gross effects
16

For details related to statistical significance, see Appendix B to Locking the Doors,
available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/gelbach_appendix_b.pdf.
17
(Cecil, 2012, p. 44) (footnote omitted).
18
See Dark Arts.
19
See, e.g., Locking the Doors, at 2311.
20
(Cecil, 2012, pp. 42-43) (n. 159).
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cannot be isolated from existing data. And that is precisely because of the
“ambiguous predictions,”21 about empirically observable objects that arise
once we take seriously the possibility that parties will respond to perceived
changes in the litigation incentives.
Finally, Cecil makes the startling claim that in Locking the Doors, I
“assume[] that the courts will respond to motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim in cases filed after Iqbal by granting such motions at
approximately the same rate a[s] in the past.”22 But I do no such thing. I
simply point out that when parties respond to perceived changes in the
pleading standard, there is no way to determine how courts, in particular,
respond. This is just another instance in which we cannot use data that
reflect net changes to measure multiple gross effects—here, it is how courts
respond, other things equal, whereas previously it was how plaintiffs
respond, other things equal.
I turn now to some methodological concerns that the approach in
Locking the Doors does need to confront.
II. CONFOUNDING FACTORS
One assumption necessary to justify the approach in Locking the Doors
is that the composition of disputes that actually occur in the post-Iqbal
period is not importantly different from the composition of disputes that
would have occurred in this period if Twombly and Iqbal had never
happened. Roughly speaking, this is equivalent to assuming that Twombly
and Iqbal were the only causes of the differences in the numbers of cases
and Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed, and in adjudication of those Rule 12(b)(6)
motions that were filed.
If, for example, the Great Recession caused a big uptick in disputes
related to alleged employment discrimination, then even in the absence of
Twombly and Iqbal we would expect to observe more Rule 12(b)(6)
motions filed and granted.23 Moreover, as I also discuss in Locking the
Doors, Twombly and Iqbal might embolden potential defendants (e.g.,
employers) to engage in more aggressive behavior (e.g., layoffs that have a
disparate impact on minority or female workers).24 If such confounding
factors are present, my approach could misattribute at least some of the
change in the number of post-Iqbal Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted or filed.
Whether such a problem leads to upward or downward bias in my reported
lower bounds would necessarily depend on how frequently Rule 12(b)(6)
21

(Cecil, 2012, p. 44) (n. 163).
(Cecil, 2012, p. 44).
23
See Part VI.B.1 of (Gelbach, 2012, pp. 2336-37) for more on this point.
24
See id., at 2337.
22
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motions are filed and granted in cases that appear in the data due to
confounding factors.
The FJC reports’ authors, Cecil on his own, and Engstrom all have
suggested an additional source of problematic compositional change: that
changes in the geographic distribution of cases have occurred, that these
changes were caused by something other than Twombly/Iqbal, and that they
are important in understanding observed changes in who wins at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage. Cecil argues that for this reason, the only way to reliably
measure Twombly and Iqbal’s impact is to use estimates from multivariate
models that include dummy variables indicating the judicial district in
which each case was filed:
As noted in both of our reports, the corrections for factors unrelated to
Twombly and Iqbal often account for the statistically significant
differences that appear in the simple comparison between the pre‐Twombly
and post‐Iqbal periods. To ignore the findings of these multi[variate]
models and rely on the raw frequencies confounds changes that can be
attributed to Twombly and Iqbal with numerous other changes that are
unrelated to the effect of those decisions on the substantive standards of
pleadings and the extent to which cases may progress beyond the pleading
stage to discovery.25

Cecil is not the only one to take this view. Engstrom writes that
variables designed to control for variation in outcomes by judicial district
and case type may … control for a … general concern about unobserved
case heterogeneity—that is, the possibility that simple shifts across the
pre- and post-Twiqbal periods in the distribution of case types, litigants, or
judges are behind observed differences in outcomes.26

These are familiar and good arguments for using covariates. It goes
without saying that when confounding factors exist and can be accounted
for using measurable variables without introducing any further problems,
covariates should be used. On the other hand, some covariates are
inappropriate to include. For example, a general rule of applied statistics is
that variables that are themselves partly determined by the outcome variable
are inappropriate to use as independent variables.
Consider an apparently unrelated example from micro-econometrics—
the problem of demand estimation. Suppose one wants to estimate how
county-level demand for a good changes with the presence of county
ordinances that regulate its sale. To do so, one might regress county-level
25
26

(Cecil, 2012, p. 39) (footnote omitted).
(Engstrom, 2013, pp. 1217-18).
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observed quantity on a dummy indicating the presence of the county
ordinance. Should one include county-level price? On the one hand, price is
related to quantity if one accepts the theory of supply and demand, which
makes it seem like price belongs in the model as a regressor. On the other
hand, the theory of supply and demand implies that price and quantity are
endogenously determined together; thus, price cannot be included if the
researcher uses ordinary estimation methods (such as ordinary least
squares). One approach here is to exclude price, in which case the estimated
coefficient on income should be interpreted as a reduced form effect—the
association of county ordinances with quantity including not only any
direct relationship between the ordinances and quantity, but also any
indirect relationship that operates through variations in price.27 The
alternative approach is to find a valid instrumental variable for price, in
which case one is able to isolate the direct effect of ordinances on
quantity.28 Either way, simply including price in ordinary (non-instrumental
variables) estimation is likely to be a problematic approach.
Further, sometimes even when a set of covariates has a strong
relationship with the outcome variable, the estimated effect of other
variables will not be affected by whether the researcher includes or excludes
the first set of variables. I show below that this is exactly the case in the
context of my lower bound estimates: the qualitative and numerical
conclusions I reported above in Locking the Doors (and repeated in Part II
above) are entirely robust to using the FJC authors’ multivariate estimates.
III. WHY GEOGRAPHICAL CONTROLS MIGHT NOT BE APPROPRIATE IN
STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
For practical purposes any important differences between using the
FJC’s multivariate estimates and the use I make of the FJC’s raw data
would have to be connected to systematic changes in the geographical
pattern of motion filings, between 2006 and 2010, that are not caused by
Twombly and Iqbal. To control for such changes, the FJC authors included
as covariates in their models a set of 20 judicial district dummy variables.29
What good reason is there to include these dummies? In other
words, why should anyone worry about an exogenous shift in the
geographical pattern of motion filings? Engstrom suggests one possible
answer:
27

See (Greene, 2008) for a discussion of reduced form coefficients in linear regression
models.
28
See id.
29
There are a few other variables in these models, but for reasons I explain in section
2, infra, they are unimportant to the present discussion.
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an idiosyncratic corporate event in the post-Twiqbal period—
perhaps a large company moves its corporate headquarters to
another district, producing a substantial downsizing of its whitecollar workforce in the district—could yield a large number of job
discrimination filings that are high-value compared to the preTwiqbal run of cases and so are also lower probability cases
relative to pre-Twiqbal cases under standard assumptions that the
litigant filing calculus turns, at least in part, on a case’s expected
value. Under this scenario, a regression analysis that does not
include covariate controls for judicial district would wrongly
suggest a larger Twiqbal effect than is warranted.30

Engstrom does not point to any such corporate events, and it is
unclear how prevalent they were in the relevant time period. It is also
unclear why such an event would lead to especially high-value employment
discrimination cases.31 It is also unclear why the litigant’s filing calculus
should lead to a predictable increase in case quality among actually filed
cases, because a factor that makes a case obviously high-value likely is
observable to both sides.32
More generally, the question lurking behind this discussion is
simple: why do we think it might be true that “some of the districts with the
highest grant rates were also the districts that showed the greatest increase
30

(Engstrom, 2013, p. 1218) (n. 51).
If anything, moving a whole corporate headquarters would seem to insulate rather
than expose an employer, since both the defendant and any plaintiffs can expect the
defendant to have an easy time establishing a legitimate business necessity basis under
Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). That could lead to low expected damage
values for the plaintiffs in the event such cases make it to judgment, even if the salaries of
would-be plaintiffs are high. Thus it is possible that such cases would be low-value, rather
than high-value, by comparison to the pre-Twombly/Iqbal run of cases.
32
For a detailed elaboration of this point in the summary judgment context, see
(Gelbach, 2014, p. "Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics"). Engstrom offers a second
example of how nettlesome geographic changes in the case distribution might have
occurred: “Covariate controls would similarly be indicated if some districts were to
implement new case management practices post-Twiqbal that mute [TwIqbal’s] effects as
to all or certain case types.” (Engstrom, 2013, p. 1218) (n. 51) (citing FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., PILOT PROJECT REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR
EMPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE ACTION (2011), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/DiscEmpl.pdf/$file/DiscEmpl.pdf, as “describing
new pretrial procedure for job discrimination cases to be piloted by particular district
judges”). I agree that implementation of meaningfully different discovery protocols by
judges in some districts but not others during the post-Twombly/Iqbal data period could be
a good reason to control for judicial district. But the pilot project report Engstrom cites is
dated November 2011—after the latest possible activity in any case coded for the FJC’s
reports.
31
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in the number of orders”?33 To validate their use of judicial district
dummies as regressors in their multivariate models, Cecil and his co-authors
need this relationship to be exogenous—not caused by Twombly and Iqbal.
But if we accept that parties will change their behavior in response to
pleading standard changes, how can we also assume that these behavioral
responses are unrelated to characteristics of local districts? In fact,
“controlling” for the change in the geographical pattern of motion filings
could yield misleading results. It is possible that it is no accident that “some
of the districts with the highest grant rates were also the districts that
showed the greatest increase in the number of orders.”34 Contra Cecil, then,
it is at least possible that “variations in motion practice in individual
districts”35 are not “unrelated”36 to the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, but in
fact are causal effects of them.
Further, there is the risk in this literature that both producers and
consumers of the civil procedure research will project talismanic powers
onto multivariate regression analysis. At most, such analysis is only as good
as the regressors, and the ones that are feasible to include are far from
comprehensive. For example, aside from variables that allow estimated
changes in the grant probability to vary by case type categories and districtlevel dummies, which I discuss in detail infra, the only additional regressors
used in the FJC reports are dummy variables allowing the change in the
grant probability to vary with the presence of an amended complaint. It
seems hard to believe that there are no other important determinants of
grant probabilities besides this short list.37
Of course, in the best of all possible worlds one would have access
to variables recording every conceivably important exogenous aspect of
cases. The wish list includes case quality, the parties’ beliefs concerning
the probability a judge would grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and so on. One
would of course include these variables as covariates in multivariate
analysis if one could, obviating every imaginable source of bias in
estimating the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on grant rates. In the real
world, though, available variables may not be exogenous, and it might be
worse to include them than to ignore them. Unfortunately, none of the
Twombly/Iqbal studies that uses multivariate models even addresses this
33

(Cecil, et al., March 2011, p. 13).
Id.
35
(Cecil, 2012, p. 39).
36
Id.
37
Even Alex Reinert’s longer list of covariates surely misses plenty of case detail; he
includes regressors related to whether an amended complaint is present, the judicial district,
the nominating president, whether the claimant is an individual, corporation, government,
or other organization, and whether the movant fits each of these categories. See (Reinert,
2015 (forthcoming)).
34
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issue.
All of that said, it is worth asking: were there important
geographical shifts in the distribution of cases? And, would using the FJC’s
multivariate model-generated estimates make any difference? These are the
questions to which I turn next.
IV. DOES IT EVEN MATTER WHETHER ONE “CONTROLS” FOR GEOGRAPHICAL
SHIFTS VIA MULTIVARIATE MODELS?
In taking into account the multivariate models in this section, I shall
focus only on those related to the share of movants prevailing. That is, I
shall continue to use the initial report’s raw data, rather than its
multivariate-model estimates, to measure changes in the prevalence of
motion filing.38 The estimates in question appear in Table A-2 of the
updated report,39 which provides coefficients and standard errors from
estimation of a binary logit model concerning whether the Rule 12(b)(6)
movant prevailed. The estimated model includes the following variables as
predictors: a Year 2010 dummy; case type dummies and their interactions
with the Year 2010 dummy; an amended complaint dummy and its
interaction with the Year 2010 dummy; judicial district dummies; and a
constant.
Including case type dummies and their interactions with the postIqbal dummy is just a parameterized way of measuring grant rate
differences separately by case category. In Locking the Doors and above, I
separately considered employment discrimination cases and other civil
rights cases, so using the raw data cannot cause any problem related to case
type dummies.40
As a threshold matter, Table 1, supra, shows that for both
employment discrimination cases and the combined category of cases
involving contract, tort, or “other” causes of action, the change in the grant
rate contributes essentially nothing to the lower bounds reported in Locking
the Doors.41 Consequently, one could replace these figures with 0.0 and no
38

I do so in part to save space; in any case, a quick comparison of Tables 1 and 2 of
the initial report suggests that using the FJC multivariate model for motion filing would
slightly inflate, rather than reduce, my lower bound estimates.
39
(Cecil, et al., March 2011, p. 8).
40
I did combine most other case types into my contracts, torts, and “other” case
category. Separately calculated lower bounds for each of these case categories are 18.4%
for contracts, 23.4% for torts, and 24.7% for “other” cases, by comparison to a figure of
21.5% reported in Locking the Doors, at 2334, for the three case types considered together.
41
See Table 1 in Part III.E, infra (showing that the change in the grant rate used in
Locking the Doors was 0.2 percentage points for civil rights cases and 1.1 points for the
contracts, tort, and other case category, by comparison to lower bound amounts of 15.4 and
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conclusion in Locking the Doors would change for those case categories. So
what is actually at issue is only the change in the grant rate for civil rights
cases. Accordingly, I will concentrate attention on those cases only.
First consider the question of whether Cecil is right that shifts in the
distribution of cases across judicial districts lead to important differences in
my results. To see how Cecil could be right, consider the simple example in
Table 2. The table’s first column provides the predicted percentage of the
time—based on the FJC updated report model—that a movant would
prevail on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in a 2006 civil rights case with no
amended complaint filed in either of two districts—the Middle District of
Florida, where the percentage is 43.9%, and the Southern District of New
York, where it is much higher, at 73.3%.42
In Period 1 of Table 2’s hypothetical example, half of all cases are
filed in each of these two districts, which implies that the movant would
prevail in 58.6% of motions filed in the two districts considered together
(see the table’s third row). Now imagine that between Period 1 and Period
2, there is a massive shift in the population of cases—either fewer are filed
in the Middle District of Florida, more are filed in the Southern District of
New York, or both. As a result, more than three-fourths (78.5%, to be
exact) of cases in the Period 2 case population are filed in the Southern
District of New York, where the movants prevail much more frequently.
Consequently, the population-level percentage of movants prevailing in
motions across the two districts considered together rises to 67%. In this
example, then, the probability that movants prevail increases by 8.4
percentage points even though the probability that a movant prevails is
unchanged in each district following Twombly/Iqbal; the increase occurs
simply because of a change in the composition of the case population.
Did the sort of shift in the case population illustrated in Table 2
occur between the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods in the updated
report’s outcomes study? Consider Table 3, which conducts a real-world
version of the hypothetical analysis in Table 2. Its first row reports the
actual percentage of civil rights cases in which the movant prevails, as
reported in the updated report. This percentage was 58.6 in 2006 and 67.0 in
2010, so that the share of cases in which movants prevailed increased by 8.4
percentage points in this period. (I confess to rigging the hypo in Table 2 to
match these actual figures.) The table’s next two rows present predicted
percentages based on the updated report’s multivariate model. The table’s
first column provides the predicted percentage of movants prevailing in
21.5 points, respectively).
42
These are the actual estimated probabilities for these districts, based on my
calculations using the logit coefficients provided in Table A-2 of the FJC updated report,
supra note 39, at 8.
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civil rights cases filed in 2006, based on my best approximation to the 2006
geographic distribution of these cases across judicial districts.43 When I use
the 2006 geographic distribution of all cases in the FJC’s outcomes study,
the model predicts that movants would prevail in 58.7% of those civil rights
cases that were filed in 2006 and had no amended complaint. In the table’s
second column, I calculate the corresponding percentage using the 2010
geographic distribution of cases, but holding all else the same, so that each
district’s 2006 grant percentage is used.44

43

To calculate this value, I use the logit coefficients reported in Table A-2 of the FJC
updated report, supra note 39, at 8, to predict each district’s probability that the movant
would prevail in a civil rights case with no amended complaint adjudicated in 2006 (I
report these probabilities in percentage form in Table 7 in Appendix A, infra). I then
calculate the weighted mean of these predicted probabilities using the number of cases in
each district in 2006, according to the initial report’s Table B-1, at 35 (repeated in
percentage form in Table 8 of Appendix B, infra, which provides the total number of
orders the FJC authors coded in any case type, including both civil rights cases and those in
other categories).
It would be better to base the geographic distribution on only the set of civil rights
cases with no amended complaint that were included in estimation of the model used to
estimate the model whose coefficients are provided in the updated report’s Table A-2. For
this reason I requested such data from Joe Cecil, who was generous in meeting several
earlier data requests. Cecil declined to accommodate this data request, though, explaining
that
[w]e are presently seeking authorization to make the research data more broadly available
through a public archive, and we will wait until this issue is resolved before fulfilling any
additional individual requests.…If we are unable to obtain authorization to make the data
available through a public archive, we will then seek permission to respond individually to
your request and consult with you about how we can best meet your needs.

E-mail from Joe Cecil to author, time-stamped Tue, 18 Feb 2014 09:39:15. While I would
of course prefer to use the actual data in question, the data from Table B-1 of the initial
report that I use here are the best possible approximation given the information the FJC
authors have released publicly. Using these data amounts to imposing the assumption that
the pattern of changes in the cross-district distribution of all cases civil rights cases with no
amended complaint that were coded and included in the updated report’s Table A-2
estimation changed in the same ways as this pattern changed in the subset of these cases
reported as involving civil rights.
44
See note 43, infra, for details on the geographic distribution in question.
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Table 2: Example of How a Geographic Shift Case Population
Could Cause an Increase in the Percentage of Movants Prevailing Even
When this Percentage is Unchanged in Each District
Model-Based
2006 Percentage
of Time Movant
Prevailsa

Hypothetical Percentage of
Case Population
Period 1

Period 2

Middle
District of
Florida

43.9

50

21.5

Southern
District of
New York

73.3

50

78.5

58.6

67.0

Percentage
of movants
prevailing
among all
cases in both
districts

Difference

8.4

a

Source: Author’s calculations using coefficient estimates provided in Table A-2 of FJC
updated report, at 8.

With the 2010 geographic distribution of cases and the 2006 modelbased prediction for movant-prevailing frequency, I find that movants
would prevail in 58.8% of civil rights cases having no amended
complaint—virtually identical to the 58.7% figure obtained using the actual
2006 geographic distribution. And the corresponding figures for cases with
amended complaints suggest that in those cases, the predicted percentage of
movants prevailing in 2006 is 58.4% with both geographic distributions.
Contrary to claims in the updated report and Cecil’s Waves, then, the
change in the geographic distribution of cases explains virtually none of the
actually observed increase in the percentage of movants prevailing for civil
rights cases.
Given the foregoing discussion, how can Cecil be right when he states
that “corrections for factors unrelated to Twombly and Iqbal often account
for the statistically significant differences that appear in the simple
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comparison between the pre‐Twombly and post‐Iqbal periods”?45 The
answer is simple: with respect to the statistics that are actually at issue,
Cecil isn’t right.
Table 3: The Actual Geographic Shift in the Case Population
Would Not Have Changed the Observed 2006 Grant Rate
2006
Geographic
Distribution

2010
Geographic
Distribution

Difference

58.6a

67.0a

8.4

Model-based Estimates
No amended complaint

58.7b

58.8b

0.1

With amended complaint

58.4b

58.4b

0.0

Actual data
Raw share

a
b

Source: Table A-1 of FJC updated report, at 8.
Source: Based on author’s calculations using coefficient estimates provided in Table A-2
of FJC updated report, at 8, and reported counts in Table B-1 of FJC initial
report, (Cecil, et al., March 2011, p. 35) (see Table 7 of Appendix A, infra, and
Table 8 of Appendix B, infra, for data used in these calculations).

In the first row of Table 4, I repeat the raw percentages of civil
rights cases in which the updated report’s authors coded movants as
prevailing (once again, these figures are 58.6% for 2006 and 67.0% for
2010). In the table’s second row, I report estimated percentages for the preTwombly and post-Iqbal periods in the second row of Table 4, for cases
with no amended complaint filed in one of the updated report’s baseline
districts.46 The predicted percentage of movants prevailing in these districts
was 69.0% in 2006 and 77.4% in 2010.47
45

(Cecil, 2012, p. 39).
That is, the figures in the second row of Table 4 are the estimated percentage of
cases in which movants would prevail under the assumption that the case has no amended
complaint and that it occurred in the District of Maryland, the Eastern District of Michigan,
or the District of Rhode Island, which is the baseline category considered in the two FJC
reports. See Appendix A, infra, for further details on the computation of these marginal
effects.
47
These estimates are each 10.4 percentage points greater than the corresponding raw
movant-prevails rates. The reason for this difference is that cases in the reference-category
districts—those filed in the District of Rhode Island, the District of Maryland, or the
46
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Taking the difference of these predicted percentages yields the
critical result in Table 4. Calculations based on the updated report’s
multivariate model indicate that even after imposing “corrections for factors
unrelated to Twombly and Iqbal,”48 the percentage of movants prevailing in
civil rights cases with no amended complaint filed in one of the updated
report’s baseline districts increased by the identical, 8.4 percentage-point
margin as did the raw percentage.49
Table 4: Raw and Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects for
Whether the Movant Prevails in Civil Rights Cases
2006

2010

Difference

Raw

58.6

67.0

8.4

Adjusted

69.0

77.4

8.4

Difference

10.4

10.4

0

Source: Raw probabilities are taken from Table A-1 of the
FJC updated report, at 7. Adjusted probabilities are for the
FJC’s baseline category (cases with no amended complaint
that were filed in the District of Maryland, the Eastern
District of Michigan, or the District of Rhode Island) and are
based on author’s calculations using the logit functional form
together with coefficient estimates reported in Table A-2 of
the FJC updated report, at 8.

Nor is the estimated marginal effect based on the updated report’s
multivariate model any less statistically precise. Table A-1 of the FJC
authors’ updated report provides a p-value of 0.092 for a test of the null
hypothesis that civil rights case movants prevailed at the same rate in 2006
and 2010.50 My own calculations using the coefficient and variance matrix
Eastern District of Maryland—evidently had higher grant rates than average. See Table 7 in
the Appendix, infra, for corresponding estimates for the other 20 districts.
48
(Cecil, 2012, p. 39).
49
I have not cherry-picked by using the FJC authors’ omitted-districts category; in
fact, the opposite is true. Table 7 of Appendix A, infra, shows that among civil rights cases
with no amended complaint, this category has the fourth-lowest increase in the percentage
of cases in which movants prevail; the observed range is 7.6 to 10.8 percentage points. The
same table shows that the district-level estimated increases in movants’ prevailing
percentages are 2-3 percentage points lower for cases with an amended complaint, with the
district-specific percentage-point change ranging from 5.7 to 7.8. If I had access to the
distribution of cases across districts and amended-complaint status for each year studied in
the updated report (see supra note 43), I could calculate a model-adjusted nationwide
average increase in the percentage of prevailing movants. It seems clear, though, that such
an average would look very similar to the raw data’s overall increase of 8.4 points.
50
FJC updated report, supra note 39, at 7.
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estimates from Table A-2’s multivariate model yields a p-value of 0.080.51
If anything, then, there is a small increase in precision based on using the
multivariate model. Thus when Cecil claims that “the corrections for factors
unrelated to Twombly and Iqbal often account for the statistically significant
differences that appear in the simple comparison between the pre‐Twombly
and post‐Iqbal periods,”52 he is mistaken as to the one estimate I use where
there is any material issue at stake.
Perhaps it is worth noting that the updated report’s Table A-2
indicates that the estimated coefficient on the interaction of the Civil Rights
and Year-2010 variables was statistically insignificant (its reported p-value
is 0.272). However, in a nonlinear model such as logit, marginal effects
usually depend on the estimated values of multiple coefficients.
Consequently, any given marginal effect’s variance depends not only on the
variance of the Civil Rights-Year 2010 interaction, but also on the variances
of other coefficients used to estimate the marginal effect, as well as all
relevant covariance terms. Evidently the interaction coefficient in question
co-varies negatively with other coefficients in the model. Because of this
very possibility, it is not enough to look only at the p-value for the
interaction coefficient, as the updated report’s authors and Cecil appear to
have done; the results discussed in the previous paragraph show that their
approach yields incorrect statistical inferences.
In sum, I have shown that the change in the geographic distribution
of cases appears to do virtually no work in explaining why there was an
increase in the rate at which movants prevailed in civil rights cases, as this
rate is measured in the table of the updated report data that I use. In
addition, using estimates based on the updated report’s multivariate models
yields changes in the percentage of movants prevailing in civil rights cases
that are virtually identical to those I used in Locking the Doors and above.
These findings flatly contradict Cecil’s insistence that my results are
somehow confounded.53

51

Appropriately estimating the variance of a logit model’s marginal effect involves the
delta method. Computing delta method variance estimates requires the full estimated
covariance matrix, rather than only variance estimates for individual coefficients. The
FJC’s updated report provides the estimated coefficient vector β in its Table A-2. However,
as is conventional, the table reports only the estimated standard errors for each coefficient
estimate, rather than the full estimated variance matrix V (the estimated standard errors are
the square-roots of the main-diagonal elements of this matrix). I requested and received the
full estimated covariance matrix V for Table A-2 of the updated report; I am grateful to Joe
Cecil and Margie Williams for providing me with this information.
52
(Cecil, 2012, p. 39).
53
(Cecil, 2012, p. 39).
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V. ISSUES RELATED TO THE DATA COLLECTION
It goes without saying that the data used in an empirical study should
reasonably represent the variables of interest. For example, a study directed
at measuring the effects of Twombly and Iqbal that cannot distinguish
adjudication of Rule 12(b)(6) motions and Rule 56 summary judgment
motions would not be using appropriate data.
The most common approach in the literature has been to use the results
of a search of the electronic data bases hosted by Westlaw and Lexis. A
typical approach is to search for cases whose text includes strings indicating
that Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal was cited, and/or that phrases such as “no
set of facts” of variations on “plausible” appear.54 All studies I shall
mention have a pre-Twombly data period (which is sometimes referred to as
the Conley period). In addition to this period, some studies have only a postTwombly/pre-Iqbal data period,55 others have cases from only a post-Iqbal
period,56 and a third group have cases from all three periods.57 Such studies
have been criticized because those cases that are included in electronic case
data bases may be systematically skewed in important ways.58
A second approach is to base data collection on federal district court
dockets. Three such studies have collected data relating to events occurring
either pre-Twombly or post-Iqbal,59 while a fourth uses data relating to these
periods as well as the period between Twombly and Iqbal.60 The advantage
of this approach is that, in principle, it covers the universe of relevant cases,
though the shortcut approach of “using CM/ECF codes entered by court
clerks at the time that motions and orders are docketed” apparently caused

54

See, for example, (Moore, 2012, p. 610).
See (Hannon, 2008); (Seiner, 2010); (Seiner, 2009); and (Hubbard, 2013).
56
See (Quintanilla, 2011); and (Dodson, 2012).
57
See (Moore, 2012, p. 610); (Moore, 2010); (Brescia, 2011-2012); and (Brescia &
Ohanian, 2013-2014).
58
See (Engstrom, 2013, pp. 1214-1215); (Cecil, 2012, pp. text at notes 99-105); and
(Cecil, et al., March 2011, p. 37). But see (Moore, 2012, p. 608) (arguing “that district
court orders ruling on 12(b)(6) motions in Westlaw are fairly representative of the universe
of all such district court orders”) (emphasis in original).
59
See (Cecil, et al., March 2011) (explaining that the CM/ECF code-based procedure
the FJC authors used was “intended to be equivalent to identifying motions and orders
through docket sheet entries and then reviewing documents linked to the docket entries.”);
Cecil, et al, FJC updated report, supra note 39 (following up on a subset of the cases
included in the initial report); Reinert, Measuring Iqbal, supra note 37.
60
See Morgan L.W. Hazelton, Procedural Postures: The Influence of Legal Change on
Strategic Litigants and Judges (March 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript prepared for
2014 Midwest Political Science Association Conference in Chicago). Hazelton studies
changes in plaintiffs’ pleading behavior following Twombly and Iqbal.
55
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the FJC authors to miss some motions in some districts studied.61
Finally, in two studies, William Hubbard has used data on case
terminations from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC).62
One of these studies includes cases filed between April 6, 2006 and May 21,
2006, for its pre-Twombly period, and cases filed between the same calendar
dates a year later for its post-Twombly period.63 The idea here is that (i)
Twombly was handed down on May 21, 2007, (ii) Rule 12(b)(6) motions are
unlikely to be filed, briefed, and adjudicated in fewer than 45 days, and (iii)
May 21 is 45 days after April 6. Since all cases in Hubbard’s post-Twombly
period will have been filed before Twombly was handed down, Hubbard
reasons that this sample design will avoid any plaintiff selection effects,
while at the same time allowing him to compare cases that face the preTwombly pleading standard (the included cases filed in calendar year 2006)
to cases that face the post-Twombly standard (the included cases filed in
calendar year 2007).64 Hubbard’s other study uses a similar approach, using
cases filed in 2008 and 2009, to create a set of cases that were all filed in the
45 days before Iqbal; within these cases, he then compares those whose
dispositive Rule 12(b)(6) motions would have been adjudicated before Iqbal
to those for which the adjudication would have happened after Iqbal.
One quirk of Hubbard’s design is that he considers cases to have been
dismissed in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if the AOUSC codes
them as terminating within 225 days. This 225-day cutoff will surely cause
him to miss a large fraction of cases in which Rule 12(b)(6) motions are
granted with leave for the plaintiff to amend her complaint, after which a
defendant files another Rule 12(b)(6) motion that ultimately terminates the
action. Evidence in the initial report suggests that grants with leave to
amend became more common following Twombly and Iqbal, so this could
be a consequential problem.65 Unfortunately, there is no way to address this
61
See (Cecil, 2012, pp. 3-4) (relating finding that “some districts included in [the FJC
authors’ initial report’s filing] study employ idiosyncratic coding practices when entering
the CM/ECF data”), and id., at 4 (stating that the FJC authors “are presently locating these
missing motions and orders using docket sheet entries and other sources of information,
and will reanalyze the data to determine what effect this has on our original findings.”).
62
See (Hubbard, 2013); and Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, Litigation, and
Settlement, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2360723 (January 23, 2014).
63
(Hubbard, 2013, p. 55).
64
But see Fed. R. of Civ. P. 41(a) (allowing plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss an action
without court approval when opposing parties have not answered or moved for summary
judgment, or when all parties that have appeared stipulate to the dismissal).
65
See (Cecil, et al., March 2011, pp. 7, text at n. 12). Moreover, many cases may not
have had a first Rule 12(b)(6) motion adjudicated in less than 225 days. The source
Hubbard cites as support for his 225-day cutoff indicates that in cases that terminated in
fiscal year 2006 in eight district courts, the mean time from Rule 12(b)(6) motion filing to
ruling was 130 days. See Table 9 of Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
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problem using Hubbard’s data, because the AOUSC assigns the same
termination code to cases that are terminated on Rule 12(b)(6) motions as to
those that are terminated on Rule 56 motions. The longer the time elapsed
following case initiation, the greater the share of such cases that will have
been terminated at summary judgment rather than for failure to state a
claim,66 and it is for this reason that Hubbard must use a relatively short
cutoff period.
A second problem with Hubbard’s data is that the AOUSC codes only
for termination of an entire action. This means that his dismissal variable is
limited neither to claim-specific dismissals, nor to dismissals that eliminate
fewer than all plaintiffs. Only when all claims of all plaintiffs are
eliminated, with judgment then entered and the action terminated, would
Hubbard’s data allow him to observe that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion has been
decided.
In Locking the Doors, I used data from the FJC initial report’s filing
study to measure the number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed, where such
measures are needed. Where I used information related to outcomes of Rule
12(b)(6) motions, I drew that information from the FJC updated report’s
frequency tabulations concerning numbers of cases in which the defendant
ultimately prevails. Concerning the definition of “prevails”, the updated
report states that
We identified cases in which the movant prevailed as those in which the
court granted the last motion to dismiss in whole or in part and no
opportunity to amend the complaint remained. This included all cases in
which the motion was granted with leave to amend, but no amended
complaint was submitted during the time allowed. We identified cases in
which the respondent prevailed as those in which the last motion to
dismiss was denied, or in which the respondent submitted an amended
complaint and the movant chose not to respond with an additional motion

System, CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 48 (2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/IAA
LS,%20Civil%20Case%20Processing%20in%20the%20Federal%20District%20Courts.pdf
. The median time was considerably lower, at 97 days, id., which indicates substantial
right-skewness, so it is possible that a substantial share of cases take considerably longer
than 130 days. And of course, there is a lag between case filing and the date when
defendants file Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
66
Cecil reports that 28% of cases included in the FJC updated report’s post-Iqbal
period had been initiated before May 19, 2009. (Cecil, 2012, p. 43) (n. 160). All such cases
necessarily had at least one order resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on or after January 1,
2010, which is 226 days after May 19, 2009. To the extent that the statistics are similar for
the relevant dates surrounding Twombly, then, Hubbard’s data construction approach may
exclude a nontrivial number of cases that should be included.
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to dismiss.67

Thus the outcomes data used in Locking the Doors correspond relatively
well to the colloquial idea that the “grant” of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
precludes further litigation of those claims for which the motion was
granted.68
For the balance of this section, I shall turn to a detailed discussion of the
data in the two FJC studies. These studies are of particular note because the
initial report provides the only available data on Rule 12(b)(6) motion
filing, and the updated report provides comprehensive evidence on
outcomes of Rule 12(b)(6) motions. There are some tricky features—one
might go so far as to call them bugs—of the FJC data, and making sense
both of my results and of certain criticisms of them is most easily done with
a clear understanding of these characteristics.
A. The FJC authors’ data collection methods
The initial FJC report involved what might be considered two distinct
studies: a “filing study” and an “outcomes study.” The updated FJC report
concerned only outcomes. I discuss each of these studies in turn in sections
1-3 below. For reference, Table 5 summarizes the time periods during
which cases included in each study were filed (middle column) or studied
(final column).

67

FJC updated report, supra note 39, at 3.
Rule 41(b) provides that “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise, … [a
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)] operates as an adjudication on the merits,” so a grant
without leave to amend carries prejudice. Cf. Semtek v. Lockheed Martin, 531 U.S. 497
(2001) (providing that in cases for which subject matter jurisdiction is founded only on
diversity, Rule 41(b)’s effect bars refiling the same claim in the same U.S. district court but
bars refiling in another court only to the extent that the courts of the state where the U.S.
district court sits would accord the dismissal preclusive effect).
I note that there is one substantive failure of correspondence between the colloquial
idea and the FJC’s coding approach. I refer interested readers to the discussion of “Type Z”
disputes in Dark Arts, supra note 7.
68
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Table 5: Study Periods for the Filing and Outcomes Studies in the
Initial and Updated Report
FJC Study
A. Initial report
1. Filing

2. Outcomes

B. Updated report
3. Outcomes

Cases Filed During:

Case Activity Study Period:

Pre-Twombly cases:
Pre-Twombly cases:
October 2005 –
October 2005 –
June 2006
September 2006
Post-Iqbal cases:
Post-Iqbal cases:
October 2009 –
October 2009 –
June 2010
September 2010
Pre-Twombly cases:
Dates before
January 2006
Post-Iqbal cases:
Dates before
January 2010

Pre-Twombly cases:
January –
June 2006
Post-Iqbal cases:
January –
June 2010

Pre-Twombly cases:
Dates before
January 2006
Post-Iqbal cases:
Dates before
January 2010

Pre-Twombly cases:
January 2006 –
September 1, 2011
Post-Iqbal cases:
January 2010 –
September 1, 2011

1. The initial report’s filings study
In what I call the “filing study,” the FJC authors “used the courts’
CM/ECF codes indicating the filing of motions to dismiss and related orders
to identify electronic documents with relevant motions … that were in PDF
format and were linked to the civil case docket sheets.”69 This search was
conducted across all civil cases that were filed in any of 23 district courts70
between October 2005 and June 2006 (the “pre-Twombly period”), and
between October 2009 and June 2010 (the “post-Iqbal period”). These
periods are indicated by the two boxes with solid outlines in the top part of
69

(Cecil, et al., March 2011, p. 5). The authors explain that this procedure was
“intended to be equivalent to identifying motions and orders through docket sheet entries
and then reviewing documents linked to the docket entries.” Id.
70
These 23 district courts “account for 51% of all federal civil cases filed during”
2009. Id.
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the timeline in Figure 1. The FJC authors coded these cases as having a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed if such a motion was filed within 90 days of case
filing. For the pre-Twombly data period, then, any Rule 12(b)(6) motion
filing activity is observed for the period running from October 1, 2005,
through September 30, 2006 (the latest date when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
could be coded for a case filed on June 30, 2005). Similarly, the post-Iqbal
data period covers Rule 12(b)(6) motion filing activity for the period
running from October 1, 2009, through September 30, 2010.71 In Figure 1,
the boxes with dashed outlines, adjacent to those discussed just above,
represent the FJC authors’ coding of motion-filing activity in the period
after June 30 of 2006 and 2010.

71

Cecil describes the FJC authors’ choice to use a 90-day window as being “a
consequence of trying to obtain current data on cases filed following Iqbal.” (Cecil, 2012,
p. 9). The initial report was issued in March, 2011, and in light of the high demand for
information on Rule 12(b)(6) practice following Twombly and Iqbal, the FJC authors had to
stop coding motion filing activity at some point.
To my knowledge, no one, including any of the FJC authors, has followed up this
study to determine whether a longer follow-up period would have appreciably changed the
conclusions that can be drawn from the data subject to the 90-day cutoff. Perhaps some
sense of the importance of the 90-day cutoff can be gleaned from a quick consideration of
the Rules. Defendants wishing to file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must do so before filing an
answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Under the Rules prevailing at the time (as of this writing,
pending amendments are slated to take effect on December 1, 2015), defendants waiving
service of process pursuant to Rule 4(d) generally had 60 days to file an answer, following
the date the plaintiff sends a request for a waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). Thus
defendants intending to both waive service and file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion had an incentive
to file that motion quickly, in order to avoid being compelled to file an answer before the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion can be heard. For a defendant not waiving service, Rule 4(m)
provided that a plaintiff generally had 120 days to serve process, and such defendants had
21 days to answer following the date of service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Thus as
many as 141 days might have passed before a defendant not waiving service would have
had to answer; for a non-waiving defendant’s answer to be due within 90 days, then, the
plaintiff would have had to have served process within 69 days.
Note that defendants failing to file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion before their answer was due
could still file a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings once the pleadings had
closed, as courts have held the standard for adjudicating a Rule 12(c) motion to be the same
as that for Rule 12(b)(6). Note, though, that discovery might already have begun by then;
see Rule 16 and Rule 26 for the relationship between the date of the first pretrial scheduling
conference required by Rule 16 and initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a) following the
Rule 26(f) scheduling conference. To the extent that avoiding discovery is an important
objective for defendants, then, they had incentives to file Rule 12(b)(6) motions quickly.
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Figure 1: Timeline of Events Related to Twombly, Iqbal, and FJC Data Collection
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2. The initial report outcomes study
The second study in the initial report concerned outcomes of Rule
12(b)(6) motions. To understand the data collected for this study, it is
easiest to quote the initial report at length:
To assess the changes in the outcomes of motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, we identified orders responding to motions decided in
January through June of 2006 and 2010. … We indicated whether a
motion was denied, was granted as to all relief requested by the motion, or
was granted as to some but not all of the relief requested by the motion.
These last two categories were often combined in the analyses and we
simply noted that the motion was granted. In those instances in which the
court granted at least some of the relief requested by the motion, we also
coded whether the plaintiff was allowed to amend the complaint, and
whether the motion eliminated only some claims or all claims of one or
more plaintiffs.72

The key point to understand regarding the data in the initial report’s
outcomes study is that its unit of analysis is orders resolved (i) between
January and June 2006 and (ii) between January and June of 2010. The
outcomes study’s data collection differs from the initial report’s filing study
in two ways. First, the calendar periods covered differ. The filing study
includes information collected from case activity occurring between
October 1, 2005 and September 30, 2006 for the pre-Twombly period, and
between October 1, 2009 and September 30, 2010 for the post-Iqbal period.
By comparison, the initial report’s outcomes study includes information
collected from case activity occurring between January 1 and June 30, 2006
for the pre-Twombly period, and between January 1 and June 30, 2010 for
the post-Iqbal period.
Second, the structure of data collection differs. The filing study has a
cohort structure: for both the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods,
outcomes for cases in the filing study are coded based on activity that
occurs during a fixed and equal period of time (90 days) following case
initiation. Data constructed in this way are sometimes called flow samples,
since units are selected as they flow into a particular situation.73 By
contrast, the outcomes study is based on what is sometimes called a stock
sample of cases, because that study selects cases that experience a given
event during a period of time, regardless of when those cases were
72

(Cecil, et al., March 2011, p. 5). Note that the initial report excludes prisoner cases
and cases with pro se parties as well as information related to Rule 12(b)(6) motions that
responded to counterclaims and affirmative defenses. Id.
73
See, e.g., (Lancaster & Chesher, 1981).
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initiated.74 The important distinction for present purposes is that a
potentially substantial amount of time may have elapsed between a case’s
initiation and orders resolving any Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
My Figure 1 timeline indicates all this by (i) using boxes with solid
outlines to represent the time period for which the outcomes study collects
information on cases with orders resolving Rule 12(b)(6) motions, and (ii)
using dotted arrows pointing leftward to represent the fact that the cases
selected for inclusion in the outcomes study must have been filed at some
earlier date. The FJC reports do not provide detailed information either
concerning the dates on which the stock-sampled cases included in the
outcomes study were filed, or concerning the filing dates of the Rule
12(b)(6) motions resolved by the orders the FJC authors coded. Cecil does
report in Waves that 28% of cases included in the outcomes study’s postIqbal period were filed before May, 2009.75 For this reason, the leftwardpointing arrow in my Figure 1 timeline extends to the left of the date when
Iqbal was filed for the initial report’s post-Iqbal adjudication cases.
3. The updated report’s follow-up outcomes study
One finding in the initial report was that between the pre-Twombly and
post-Iqbal periods studied, there was an increase in the frequency with
which judges granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions also allowed plaintiffs leave
to file an amended complaint.76 In the FJC updated report, the FJC authors
collected additional data for such cases in order to “determine the extent to
which the respondents submitted amended complaints, and report the
outcome of any subsequent motions to dismiss.”77 The updated report
includes information on “any subsequent amended complaints, motions to
dismiss, and orders resolving such motions,”78 and it states that “[o]ne or
more amended complaints were submitted in 347”79 of 543 cases80 that had
grants with leave to amend.
This supplemental collection of information for cases included in the
initial report’s outcomes study thus extended data collection past the June
30, 2006 and June 30, 2010 dates. The updated report is silent as to the
length of this extended collection period, but Cecil has informed me that

74

Id.
(Cecil, 2012, p. 43) (n. 160) (also reporting that “[o]ver 70% of the cases were filed
before October, 2009.”).
76
(Cecil, et al., March 2011).
77
(Cecil, et al., November 2011, p. 1).
78
(Cecil, et al., November 2011, p. 3).
79
Id.
80
Id.
75
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“the follow-up period is through September 1, 2011.”81 The arrows and text
in the bottom row of my Figure 1 timeline indicate that the collection
window for the updated report’s extension of the outcomes study runs
forward from January 2006 or January 2010.
B. Combining data from the FJC’s filing and outcomes studies
Cecil relates that his “greatest concern” about the empirical work in
Locking the Doors is the way I use data from the FJC’s filing and outcomes
studies together.82 The underlying basis for this concern seems to be
connected to the fact that the FJC’s outcomes data set “includes many cases
filed before the decision in Iqbal was handed down and will not accurately
reflect the courts’ response to the increased likelihood that defendants will
file a motion to dismiss.”83 The reason for this supposedly distorted
reflection is that “plaintiffs will be more selective in filing and pursuing
cases, and such selectivity would likely remove the cases with weaker
claims from the mix of cases considered by the courts.”84 Such additional
selectivity “would tend to drive down the rate at defendants file motions to
dismiss, or the rate at which judges grant such motions, or both.” 85
In Locking the Doors, I addressed issues related to the mis-match of
data collection methods in the FJC authors’ filing and outcomes studies. As
I wrote there:
some cases with MTDs adjudicated in the Iqbal period might have been
filed before Iqbal, or even before Twombly, if the cases have had enough
amended complaints. Consequently, the cross section of orders that the
FJC analyzed might not fully represent the steady state that will ultimately
develop over time. These are standard concerns when one compares cross
sections of dynamic processes that are sampled on either side of a policy
change.86

Cecil rejects this characterization of the problem in Waves, but the basis
he provides for rejecting it is actually just a re-statement of the
characterization itself.87 The subtle issues here are worth discussing for any
81

E-mail from Joe Cecil to author, time-stamped Wed, 7 Dec 2011 08:18:43 (on file
with author).
82
(Cecil, 2012, p. 42).
83
(Cecil, 2012, p. 44).
84
(Cecil, 2012, p. 44). Here Cecil pegs his argument to the presence of a substantial
plaintiff selection effect, whose presence he rejects (or, perhaps more precisely,
mischaracterizes me as rejecting) in his next paragraph. Id.
85
(Cecil, 2012, p. 44).
86
Locking the Doors, at 2338.
87
(Cecil, 2012, p. 44) (n. 162) (“But the issue is not simply waiting [for] a steady state
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who are unfamiliar with the identification of causal effects in dynamically
evolving situations. After providing that discussion, I shall present some
alternative lower bound estimates that involve only the data from the
outcomes study. Since these estimates come from only one of the FJC data
sets, any who reject the propriety of combining the data from the filing and
outcomes studies should be prepared to accept these alternative estimates.
The alternative estimates again indicate the presence of a substantial share
of negatively affected plaintiffs among those involved in cases facing Rule
12(b)(6) motions adjudicated post-Iqbal.
1. A steady state/transition lens for understanding the implications of
combining data from the two FJC data sets
Consider the stylized depiction of cases’ lifecycles presented in Figure 2.
In the figure’s simplified world, Rule 12(b)(6) motions must be filed in the
same year a case is filed, and all such motions are adjudicated the following
year. Also for simplicity, assume a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will eliminate all
claims if it is granted.
In the figure, bars represent cases filed, and other key aspects are:


Cases that will have a motion to dismiss filed are represented by
shaded bars with superimposed triangles at the time of initiation,
while those that will not have such a motion filed are represented by
the hollow bars. Thus, the numerator of the share of cases, filed at a
given time, that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed equals the
number of cases initiated at that time that are represented by the bars
with triangles. The denominator equals the number of all cases filed
at the time, which includes all those with or without a triangle.



Among cases that have a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed, the ones in
which it is granted are represented by the bars bearing a
superimposed dark “X”; those whose Rule 12(b)(6) motion is denied
bear a superimposed dark circle. The numerator of the share in
which the defendant prevails thus equals the number of such cases in
the bar with the X. The denominator equals the number of such
cases with either an X or a dark circle.

to evolve. The issue is that a sizeable portion of the cases on which Professor Gelbach
estimates the judicial response to a motion to dismiss were filed before the change he is
seeking to model. Under the terms of his model, motions with different characteristics are
likely to be filed after Iqbal, possibly resulting in a different distribution of outcomes. The
result is a model that relies on implausible assumptions to overcome internal
inconsistencies, raising issues that are far removed from ‘standard concerns.’”)
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The top set of four bars in Figure 2 represents cases filed in 2005, so that
the ones with Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed have them adjudicated in 2006.
Adjudication of these cases’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions in 2006 is the subject of
the outcomes studies described in the FJC’s initial and updated reports, as
represented by the solid oval surrounding the X and the filled-in circle. The
next-lower set of bars represents cases filed in 2006. Whether these cases
have Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed is the subject of the initial report’s filing
study, which I represent via the dashed oval around these cases.
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Figure 2: Timeline of Events Related to Twombly, Iqbal, and FJC Data Collection
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In steady state, each bar in the 2005 cohort of filed cases has the same
width as the corresponding bar in the 2006 cohort, indicating that these two
cohorts have the same numbers of cases, the same numbers with Rule
12(b)(6) motions filed, and the same numbers with Rule 12(b)(6) motions
granted. Given that the litigation system is in steady state, one would obtain
the same Rule 12(b)(6) motion filing rate if one studied (i) 2005 data on
motion filing among cases filed in 2005, or (ii) 2006 Rule 12(b)(6) filing
data using cases filed in 2006. Consequently, if the litigation system was in
steady state as to pleading behavior in 2005 and 2006, it would be
appropriate to use the pre-Twombly parts of the FJC’s filing and outcomes
studies together.
Now consider cases coded for the FJC reports’ post-Iqbal period. As
represented in Figure 2, data for the post-Iqbal part of the filing study come
from the cohort of cases filed in 2010, whereas post-Iqbal outcomes data
come from the cohort of cases filed a year earlier, in 2009. Since Iqbal was
decided on May 22, 2009, the outcomes study data may include some
“Surprise cases,” whose parties did not anticipate the new pleading
standard, alongside “Foreseen cases,” whose parties did. (Note that the
filing study’s post-Iqbal data do not have this bug, since they are flowsampled beginning after Iqbal.)
In Figure 2, the top two bars in the 2009 cohort of filed cases represent
Surprise cases that face Rule 12(b)(6) motions, and the next two bars
represent Foreseen cases that face such motions. Both types of cases are
included in the 2010 part of the outcomes study, which concerns cases
represented within the lone solid rectangle in Figure 2. The legitimate basis
for concern about the FJC data is that the Rule 12(b)(6) outcomes of the
cases inside the 2010 rectangle, considered together, might not reflect the
outcomes of the Foreseen cases taken alone. The figure also shows that this
problem would end quickly if the litigation system returned to steady state
in 2011: even if the set of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions adjudicated in
2010 includes some Surprised parties, the set of cases with Rule 12(b)(6)
motions adjudicated in 2011 would not. Clearly, then, a better approach to
data collection would have been for the FJC authors to follow (i) those
cases filed in 2010 in which (ii) Rule 12(b)(6) motions were observed in the
filing study to determine (iii) the outcomes of those motions in the cohort of
cases files in 2010.88
88

Cecil has graciously conceded this point; see (Cecil, 2012, p. 45) (“We both agree
that a better measure would be ‘a cohort‐based measure that followed a fixed set of cases
from their filing, to the filing of initial Rule 12(b)(6) [motions to dismiss], and then over
the period necessary to determine who ultimately prevails on these motions.’”) (quoting
from Locking the Doors, at 2338). He has also explained that the FJC authors did not take
this approach because of “[o]ur need to file a prompt report with the Advisory Committee
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An important implication of this analysis is that any problems created
by the FJC’s study design may well be isolated in the 2010 outcomes study
data. The fundamental problem is not, then, related to combining cases
studied as part of the collection of two different data sets. Rather, it is that
one part of one of those data sets—the post-Iqbal period in the outcomes
study—may not accurately represent the longer run post-Iqbal experience.
A second important implication is that if Surprise cases do create such
an inconsistency problem, that problem is not limited to the combining of
the FJC’s filing and outcomes studies, as Cecil would have it. Rather, if the
post-Iqbal outcomes data are inappropriate for my purposes, then they are
inappropriate for other purposes, too. Indeed, such a problem would plague
any use of the FJC’s post-Iqbal outcomes data, including not only the FJC
authors’ original use of that data, but also Cecil’s use of it to challenge both
my work and that or other authors. Further, since most other studies in this
literature all use the same stock-sampling approach to gathering post-Iqbal
data, any such problem is endemic to this literature. The problem has
nothing to do with combining data from multiple data sets, as such.89
2. Alternative estimates that use only the outcomes studies’ data
Here I provide alternative empirical measures that use only data from
the outcomes studies in the initial and final report. Thus these estimates do
not combine data from the FJC filing and outcomes studies.
In the first column of Table 6, I once again provide the estimated lower
bounds reported in Locking the Doors. In the second column, I provide a set
of alternative estimates in which Mpost in the denominator of equation (1),
above, is replaced with Gpost. That is, these estimates are based on the
formula
(2)

LB

,

≡

,

where the numerator remains the change in the number of cases in which
the movant prevails (as to one or more claims), and the denominator is the
number of post-Iqbal cases in which the movant prevails (again as to one or
more claims). These estimates do not rely on any data from the FJC’s
filings study, so they should be unobjectionable to anyone concerned by
combining data from the FJC’s two data sets.90
on Civil Rules.” Id., at 43.
89
A final interesting wrinkle is that Hubbard’s approach is built on making sure to
include Surprise cases. Only by doing so does he ensure that plaintiff selection cases do not
disappear from his “post pleading standard reform” set of cases.
90
On the other hand, as discussed supra, the estimand here differs from the one in
Locking the Doors; see section III.F.3.b of Dark Arts, 281-84.
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Table 6: Lower Bound Estimates Using Data from Only the FJC
Authors’ Outcomes study
[One-sided p-values in brackets]91

Locking the Doors
estimates
(among cases with
Rule 12(b)(6) motion
filed post-Iqbal)a

Using only data from outcomes study
Estimates
among cases
whose movants
prevail on Rule
12(b)(6) motions Alternative formula (1)
post-Iqbala
estimatesb,c

Civil rights

18.1
[0.004]

[0.005]

Employment
discrimination

15.4
[0.033]

[0.141]

Contract, tort,
and “other”

21.5
[0.000]

29.3

18.8

21.4
[0.000]

19.6
[0.008]
11.5
[0.146]
12.0
[0.001]

a

See notes to Table 1 for source and other details.
These estimates are calculated using the number of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motion
adjudicated—whether granted or denied—as a proxy for the appropriate number of cases
with a post-Iqbal Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed.
c
See supra note 91 for calculation of p-values.
b

91

To calculate p-values for the third column of Table 6, first observe that if there are
G2010 and G2006 cases in which the plaintiff loses, and D2010 and D2006 cases in which the
plaintiff wins, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, then total number of cases with a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion adjudicated is N=G2010+G2006+D2010+D2006. Dividing both numerator and
denominator of formula (3) by N, we can write the lower bound as
,
LB
where g
G /N is the share of all Rule 12(b)(6)-adjudicated cases that involve a movant’s
/ is the share of all such cases
prevailing Rule 12(b)(6) grant in year t, and
that involve a respondent’s prevailing at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Under the null hypothesis
and g
and (ii) d
and d
that no cases were negatively affected, both (i) g
should be the same up to random error. It can be shown that under the null hypothesis that
both (i) and (ii) hold, a consistent estimate of the variance of the lower bound is given
by V ≡ 4
/ , and that the lower bound is asymptotically normal with
mean zero under the null hypothesis. Dividing each estimated lower bound by the squareroot of V yields a t-statistic whose asymptotic null distribution is standard normal; the
reported p-values equal the probability that a random variable with a standard normal
distribution would take on a value greater than the t-statistic’s realized value.
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A second alternative that also does not rely on any data from the FJC’s
filing study is to implement formula (2) under the assumption that the
change in the ratio m—which measures the extent to which Rule 12(b)(6)
motion filings rose—can be appropriately estimated using the numbers of
Rule 12(b)(6) adjudication orders coded for the FJC authors’ outcomes
study. One potential problem with this approach is that changes between
2006 and 2010 in the numbers of cases with relevant orders between
January 1 and June 30 may be a poor proxy for the change in the number of
cases that had such motions filed. 92
Bearing this potential problem in mind, I report the resulting estimates
in the final column of Table 6. For civil rights cases, the approach yields a
lower bound of 19.6%, indicating that a plaintiff was negatively affected in
at least a fifth of civil rights cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was
adjudicated post-Iqbal. This estimate is essentially equivalent to the
corresponding estimate provided in Locking the Doors (18.4%), and it is
highly statistically significant. For employment discrimination cases and
cases in the contract, tort, and “other” category, the outcomes data-only
approach yields lower bound estimates that are lower than those in Locking
the Doors by roughly 4 and 10 percentage points, respectively.93 However,
both lower bounds estimates still indicate that plaintiffs were negatively
affected in at least one in nine of the cases under consideration—sizable
effects.
In sum, both approaches that use only the outcomes study’s data yield
the same qualitative conclusion. Twombly and Iqbal appear to have
negatively affected sizable shares of both those plaintiffs facing Rule
12(b)(6) motions post-Iqbal and the subset of them involved in cases in
which movants prevailed on at least one claim via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
post-Iqbal. These findings should allay concerns related to the combining of
the two FJC data sets in my preferred approach.
C. Do “Surprise” cases lead to upward bias?
I now take up the issue of whether, as Engstrom argues, the presence of
“Surprise” cases should be expected to bias my estimates upward. Engstrom
writes that
92
For example, the increase in filing of Rule 12(b)(6) motions that is apparent from the
initial report’s filing study might cause bogged-down judges to take longer to handle any
given case’s activity. The result would be an increase in the number of orders filed in the
first half of 2010, by comparison to the same part of 2006, that is smaller than the increase
in motion filing.
93
The estimated lower bound for employment discrimination cases is not statistically
significant, while the contract, tort and “other” estimate is highly significant.
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at least some portion of the orders on which [the Locking the Doors]
estimates rely are directed at plaintiffs who may have been caught off
guard by—and thus filed cases into the teeth of—Twiqbal’s elevated
pleading standard.” As a result, the FJC estimates on which Gelbach relies
likely overstate the post-Twiqbal change in the 12(b)(6) grant rate, which
will in turn inflate Gelbach’s own selection-adjusted estimates (and also
the alternate “Engstrom” calculations just presented).94

As sensible as Engstrom’s intuition seems at first pass, it is mistaken.
His claim is that when judges adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) motions actually
apply the Twombly/Iqbal standard, the probability of a Rule 12(b)(6) grant
must be greater among Surprise cases than among Foreseen cases. Thus
Engstrom is making a comparison across sets of cases, within a pleading
standard. But the only a priori information we have about Surprise cases is
that they are more likely to have Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted when the
Twombly/Iqbal standard governs than when the Conley standard governs.
That is, the information we have concerns a comparison within a set of
cases, across pleading standards—not the same as Engstrom’s comparison.
In fact, it is straightforward to construct a hypothetical example in
which all of the following are true about a collection of disputes:


The plaintiffs are caught off guard by Twombly/Iqbal and file suit,
even though the parties would have settled their disputes had they
known that the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard would apply. Thus,
these plaintiffs file “into the teeth of” the changed pleading standard,
so that these disputes are Surprise cases.



The defendants in these Surprise cases file Rule 12(b)(6) motions
under Twombly/Iqbal, so that these Surprise cases would be
represented in the FJC’s outcomes study data set.



The defendants in these cases prevail on Rule 12(b)(6) motions 40%
of the time when Twombly/Iqbal governs.

Since the real-world rate at which movants prevail is in the 55-70%
range for the case types I consider, movants in this hypo would prevail at a
lower rate in Surprise cases than in Foreseen cases.95 Thus Engstrom’s
premise—that there are Surprise cases—says nothing about how these cases
94

(Engstrom, 2013, p. 1229).
This is a result of the fact that when an overall group consists of two subgroups, the
overall rate at which movants lies between the two subgroups’ group-specific rates.
95
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affect the observed rate at which movants prevail. Indeed, this example
shows that the FJC data could just as easily understate the post-Twiqbal
change in the 12(b)(6) grant rate as overstate it. That, in turn, would deflate
my lower bound estimates—just the opposite of Engstrom’s contention.
My point here is not that we know that Engstrom’s criticism is wrong—
just that we have no particular reason to believe that it is right. I shall state
clearly that I self-consciously adopt the behavioral assumption that the rates
at which movants prevail in Surprise and Foreseen cases is similar;96 under
this assumption, the results in Locking the Doors are valid. Of course,
others are free to reject this assumption, but if they want to say anything
other than “Who knows?”, the burden is on them to offer alternative
behavioral assumptions that are sufficient to yield informative conclusions.
As I have stated elsewhere, the alternative to one set of assumptions is not
no assumptions, but rather some other set of assumptions.97

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal cases have been highly
controversial. In light of the gateway role that the pleading standard can
play in our civil litigation system, measuring the empirical effects of
pleading policy changes is important. One of the central messages of my
earlier work, Locking the Doors, was that care is required in formulating the
object of empirical study. Taking party behavior seriously, as Locking the
Doors does, leads to empirical results suggesting that Twombly and Iqbal
have had a substantial effect on plaintiffs (and thus, also, on defendants).
In their critiques of my empirical implementation, Joe Cecil and
Professor David Engstrom have raised important questions about these
results. Their questions are important enough to warrant the detailed
answers I have provided in the present paper, which, I believe, show that
the results provided and conclusions drawn in Locking the Doors continue
to stand.
An additional contribution of the present paper is that, in
confronting Cecil’s and Engstrom’s critiques, it elucidates some important
points about empirical work in civil procedure. In particular, the discussion
here suggests that researchers should carefully consider which covariates
belong in statistical models, while also taking care in assessing the
empirical importance of controlling for covariates. Further, data collection
protocols should be designed with behavioral assumptions in mind;
96

That is, I take my own advice from Dark Arts, where I argue for the importance of
being clear about what assumptions one adopts when doing empirical work.
97
See Dark Arts, at 248.
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moreover, even less than perfectly designed data protocols may be broadly
useful. Whether the fruits of particular data collection efforts are useful in
evaluating policy changes—whether alone or in tandem with other such
efforts—requires careful consideration. Such consideration must especially
include attention to the ways in which changes in litigant behavior might be
reflected in the data that are collected.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Calculation of Estimated District-Specific Changes in the Percentage of
Movants Prevailing in Civil Rights Cases Using the Updated Report’s
Binary Logit Model Estimates
The estimated coefficients from binary logit models do not generally
have a simple interpretation, because the dependent variable is a
complicated function of all of them. To measure the impact of changing one
or more regressors from one set of values to another, it is necessary to
specify the value of all the regressors at once. As a first pass, I shall use the
approach that the FJC authors took to reporting marginal effects in other
nonlinear models they estimated in the initial report,98 using a “baseline
98

See Table A-3 of the FJC initial report, which reports marginal effects from a
multinomial logit model whose outcome variable takes on one of three values that indicate
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consist[ing] of … cases decided in 2006 with no amended complaint in the
District of Maryland, the Eastern District of Michigan, or the District of
Rhode Island.”99 Given the structure of the binary logit model, the
probability of a 2006 movant’s prevailing in a Civil Rights case filed in one
of the baseline districts without an amended complaint is given by
exp
.
,
1 exp
This expression equals 0.690 since Table A-2 tells us that the
coefficient on the constant is 0.9178 and the coefficient on the CivilRights
dummy is -0.1177. The estimated probability of a 2010 movant’s prevailing
in a Civil Rights case filed in one of the baseline districts without an
amended complaint is given by
,

=

It is important in principle to recognize that
must be
included, since when we switch the year from 2006 to 2010, we turn
on not only the Civil_Rights×2010 interaction dummy, but also the
2010 dummy for the omitted category, i.e., torts. Table A-2 tells us
that
=0.0021 and
=0.4308. Plugging these
values into the definition above yields a probability estimate of
0.774.
In the bottom panel of Table 7, I report the estimated
probabilities (expressed in percentage terms) for each judicial
district. The percentages in the table are reported separately
according to whether an amended complaint was filed in the case (as
coded by the FJC authors). The table’s top panel reports the actual
percentage of movants prevailing overall, according to the raw data
reported in Table A-1 of the updated report.
The final columns of Table 7 report the actual overall raw
change (top panel) and estimated changes by district (bottom panel)
between 2006 and 2010. The overall raw change of 8.4 percentage
points is identical to the baseline change (for the omitted districts
with no amended complaint), which is represented in bold font.
Seventeen of the 21 district-specific estimates for cases with no
whether a motion was denied in full, granted with leave to amend as to at least one claim,
or granted without leave to amend as to at least one claim. (Cecil, et al., March 2011, p.
30).
99
(Cecil, et al., November 2011, p. 8). This is the same baseline category used for all
models in the two FJC reports.
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amended complaint exceed this amount, while none of the districtspecific estimates with no amended complaints do. The districtspecific estimated changes range from a low of 5.7 percentage
points (case with an amended complaint filed in the Southern
District of New York) to a high of 10.8 percentage points (case with
no amended complaint filed in the Middle District of Florida, the
District of South Carolina, or the Northern District of Texas).
B. Computations Related to Geographical Distribution of Cases
In the first two columns of Table 8, I report the number of cases for
which the initial report’s authors coded orders resolving motions to dismiss
for each district represented in the outcomes study. I emphasize that these
are the numbers of coded cases for all cases coded for the initial report’s
outcomes study, rather than the actual numbers of civil rights cases included
for each district (and amended complaint cell) in the logit model estimated
in Table A-2 of the updated report. The latter set of numbers is what would
be required to investigate the effects of the exact change in filings across
judicial districts. As noted in footnote 43, supra, Cecil refused my request
for these data; the numbers in Table 8 are the closest available
approximation.
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Table 7: Predicted Percentage of Prevailing Movants for Civil
Rights Cases, Without and With an Amended Complaint
2006

2010

Change

58.6

67.0

8.4

Amended Complaint?

Amended Complaint?

Overall
(raw data)

District
NYS
MA
GAN
OMITTED
(RI, MD, MIE)
OHS
DC
NYE
MN
NJ
INS
TXS
CAE
CAN
PAE
KS
CO
ARE
ILN
FLM
SC
TXN

No
73.3
71.3
69.2

Yes
73.0
71.0
68.8

No
80.9
79.3
77.6

Yes
78.7
77.0
75.2

Amended
Complaint?
No
Yes
7.6
5.7
8.0
6.0
8.4
6.3

69.0

68.7

77.4

75.0

8.4

6.3

68.9
67.5
66.8
66.2
65.7
62.4
60.6
59.5
57.8
55.0
54.4
52.6
50.9
50.9
43.9
45.0
44.8

68.5
67.1
66.4
65.8
65.3
62.1
60.2
59.1
57.4
54.6
54.0
52.2
50.5
50.5
43.5
44.7
44.4

77.3
76.2
75.6
75.1
74.7
71.9
70.4
69.3
67.9
65.3
64.8
63.1
61.5
61.5
54.6
55.8
55.6

74.9
73.6
73.0
72.5
72.1
69.1
67.5
66.4
64.9
62.2
61.7
59.9
58.3
58.3
51.3
52.5
52.2

8.5
8.7
8.8
8.9
9.0
9.5
9.7
9.9
10.1
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.6
10.8
10.8
10.8

6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.7
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.7
7.8
7.8
7.8
7.8
7.8

Source: Author’s calculations based on coefficients reported in Table A-2 of
FJC updated report, at 8.
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Table 8: Number and Corresponding Share of Cases Included in
Outcomes study, by District
District
FLM
TXN
SC
ILN
ARE
CO
KS
PAE
CAN
CAE
TXS
INS
NJ
MN
NYE
DC
OHS
OMITTED
(RI, MD, MIE)
GAN
MA
NYS
Total
a

Number of Cases in District
2006a
2010a
84
124
14
30
9
18
44
86
14
13
23
19
26
29
58
31
100
238
33
204
16
29
24
28
45
71
16
31
35
47
9
17
27
55

Share of Cases
2006
2010
0.120
0.101
0.020
0.025
0.013
0.015
0.063
0.070
0.020
0.011
0.033
0.016
0.037
0.024
0.083
0.025
0.143
0.195
0.047
0.167
0.023
0.024
0.034
0.023
0.064
0.058
0.023
0.025
0.050
0.038
0.013
0.014
0.039
0.045

46

78

0.066

0.064

47
14
16
700

13
23
38
1222

0.067
0.020
0.023
1

0.011
0.019
0.031
1

Source: Table B-1 of FJC initial report, (Cecil, et al., March 2011, p. 35).

